Cross-selling attempts, based on estimated purchase probabilities, are not guaranteed to succeed and such failed attempts may annoy customers. There is a general belief that crossselling may backfire if not implemented cautiously, however there is not a good understanding of the nature and impact of this negative reaction or appropriate policies to counter-balance it. This paper focuses on this issue and develops a modeling framework that makes use of a Markov decision model to account for negative customer reactions to failed sales attempts, and the effect of past contacts in managing cross-selling initiatives. Three models are analyzed, where purchase probabilities are affected from customer maturity or the number of failed attempts since the last purchase, or both. The analysis shows that customer reactions to cross-sell attempts make the purchase probabilities endogenous to the firm's cross-selling decisions; hence the optimal cross-selling policy becomes a function of customer state. The results highlight the role the cost of excessive cross-selling (direct as well as in the form of customer reactions) plays in optimal policies. Cross-sell data from a retail bank illustrates in what context the modeling framework can be applied and underlines the importance of customizing cross-sell policies to individual customers. 
INTRODUCTION
Customer relationship management, which consists of acquiring, retaining and growing or expanding customer relationships with a firm, is an important endeavor for modern service organizations. This paper is related to the growth or expansion dimension, which typically is achieved through cross-selling (Winer 2001; Gupta et al. 2006) . Crossselling aims to increase revenues generated by the sale of additional products and services to existing customers and is one of the most important practices in customer relationship management (Kamakura et al. 2003) . A McKinsey Report estimates that cross-selling can generate revenues of as much as 10% of the revenues through a bank's branch network (Eichfeld, Morse and Scott 2006) . Successful cross-selling requires a decision on the right product and the right time to attempt a sale for each customer. In an effort to identify these, researchers have analyzed data in different contexts. One relationship that has been explored is between customer tenure and cross-buying. It is believed that successful cross-selling can increase customer retention (Marple and Zimmerman 1999) and reduce customer churn (Kamakura et al. 2003; Balachander and Ghosh 2006) . Although no causality claim is made, Kamakura et al. (2003) show a positive relationship between customer tenure and the number of a bank's services used. Combined with the well known result that financial services are typically acquired sequentially (Paas and Kuijlen 2001; Li, Sun, and Wilcox 2005; Kamakura, Ramaswami, and Srivastava 1991) , Li, Sun, and Wilcox (2005) and Kamakura et al. (1991) are able to relate customer demand for a particular product next in the sequence to a customer's maturity. This maturity is said to change over time as a function of many factors like life stage changes, consumption experience, financial resource availability, etc. (Li, Sun, and Wilcox 2005) and is shown to be a good predictor for the most likely product purchase by a customer at a certain time. In the authors' words, "maturity represents an individual customer's readiness for a particular product at a certain time." We refer to this phenomenon as customer maturity in what follows.
Even though marketing research has made progress in estimating purchase probabilities making use of transactional data, augmented by survey data in some cases, by nature these are not perfect and a cross-selling attempt made based on these predictions is not guaranteed to succeed. Thus, it is possible that a firm that adopts cross-selling as a growth tactic will make sales attempts that fail and potentially may make too many of such attempts.
Indeed, Kamakura et al. (2003) argue that excessive cross-selling may irritate customers and cause switching. Intuitively, if a customer is turned off by an inappropriate cross-sell attempt, that customer would likely have a negative feeling against another sales pitch, and would probably not accept it. If the annoyance continues, he/she may try to avoid contacting the company, and even switch. Eichfeld, Morse and Scott (2006) claim that firms do not benefit from cross selling as much as they should, because of this fear of annoying customers. There is a general belief that cross-selling may backfire if not implemented cautiously, however there is not a good understanding of the nature and impact of this negative reaction or appropriate policies to counter-balance it. It is this issue that motivates the research herein.
The link between satisfaction and behavioral intentions like retention, repeat purchase and switching has been investigated in the marketing literature (for example see Bolton and Lemon 1999; Gustafsson, Johnson, and Roos 2005; van Doorn and Verhoef 2008) . According to Li, Sun, and Wilcox (2005) "customer satisfaction or service quality has a significant influence on a customer's future purchase decisions, especially for more advanced financial products (e.g., brokerage)". Van Doorn and Verhoef (2008) explore the role that negative critical incidences, i.e. events during interaction that are perceived as being negative, play on customer satisfaction and resulting customer share. Using a model where current satisfaction is affected by past satisfaction as well as attribute evaluations, the authors show that negative critical incidences have a moderating effect on how these two are weighted. An unsuccessful cross-sell attempt can be seen as a negative critical incidence; therefore failed cross-sell attempts may affect customer behavior in a similar manner. A different analogy can be made between a service failure and a failed cross-sell attempt. There is evidence in the literature that in many cases it is not the first failure, but repeated failures of the same kind that lead to dissatisfaction (Smith and Bolton 1998) . In some cases, successful service recovery can compensate for some of the negative effects of prior failures (Smith and Bolton, 1998) . A successful cross-sell attempt following earlier failures could be interpreted as a form of successful service recovery, potentially erasing the effect of earlier failures. Nevertheless, there is no specific result on the form of negative reactions to failed cross-sell attempts in the literature.
If customers react to failed cross-sell attempts, this implies that customer propensities change dynamically depending on the firm's decisions of whether to attempt a sale or not. In return, the firm's decision should take this effect into account and consider the history of the customer in decision making. The main objective herein is to illustrate a modeling framework that makes use of a Markov decision model to account for negative customer reactions to failed sales attempts in managing cross-selling initiatives. The customer's state is characterized either by their maturity since the last purchase (i.e. the number of contacts since the last purchase), or by the number of failed attempts since the last purchase, or both. In this framework, customer maturity progression and reactions are reflected on state-dependent parameters in a control model. We focus on reactions in the sense of reduction in sales potential after unsuccessful cross-sell attempts, captured by a potentially decreasing probability of success for a cross-sell attempt as a function of previous failures (i.e. attempts rejected by the customer). The basic research questions we seek to answer are: Does customer history pertaining to earlier cross-selling matter in choosing future cross-selling policies?
What is the structure of resulting policies? When are resulting policies a function of customer history? Would negative reactions to failed cross-sell attempts by customers influence crossselling decisions of a firm, and if so, how?
We illustrate that reactions that influence purchase probabilities change the optimal cross-selling policy from one that does not depend on customer history to one that is a function of customer state. Furthermore, ignoring customer reactions in cross-selling decisions can result in significant value loss compared to policies that explicitly take such a reaction into account. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews related literature. Then the modeling framework is introduced and a Markov decision model is formulated. The modeling framework is illustrated through the formulation of four specific models in the following section. Analysis of these models yields structural properties of optimal cross-selling policies. Most importantly, we show that in settings where customer dynamics affect purchase probabilities, optimal cross-sell policies take the form of thresholds that depend on the customer state. Afterwards, cross-sell data from a retail bank is used to illustrate cross-selling in practice, and to demonstrate how the modeling framework can be used in such a context. The paper ends with an overview of managerial implications.
LITERATURE
There is a vast and rapidly growing literature on customer relationship management.
We point the reader to some excellent overview articles by Winer (2001) , Kamakura et al. (2005) , Rust and Chung (2006) , as well as articles that focus on customer lifetime value (CLV) models in the marketing literature (Berger and Nasr 1998; Jain and Singh 2002; Gupta et al. 2006) , and articles that show the positive impact of improving customer satisfaction on financial performance (Rust, Moorman and Dickson 2002; Mittal et al. 2005 ).
An important stream focuses on descriptive modeling of the customer base, with the objective of measuring (Mulhern 1999 ) and understanding existing customer characteristics.
Within this stream, we only mention some articles that have directly motivated our modeling: Rust, Zeithaml and Lemon (2000) , Pfeifer and Carraway (2000) suggest Markov Chains as a tool for modeling customer relationships and Netzer et al. (2008) 
consider hidden Markov
Chains to model the dynamics of customer relationships. We similarly model customer dynamics using a Markovian model. Schmittlein et al. (1987) and Schmittlein and Peterson (1994) , who model the probability that a customer's relationship continues with the firm, motivate our assumptions for Poisson contacts and exponential life time of customers. Subsequent research builds on the descriptive models and tries to not only measure but also improve customer equity through optimization. Ho et al. (2006) extend the model of Schmittlein et al. (1987) to include satisfaction and optimize investment on customer satisfaction. Rust et al. (2004) find the optimal marketing interventions by calculating their impact on customer lifetime value. This is done by estimating a Markov switching matrix to model customer behavior for different marketing interventions. Venkatesan and Kumar (2004) predict CLV and use it to optimize resource allocation for marketing contacts with the customer. Most of this literature adopts a static optimization approach. The paper by Ching et al. (2004) considers optimization of promotion budget allocation to maximize CLV, and is one of the few that use dynamic optimization.
Research related to cross-selling is classified in Table 1 , based on the focus of analysis, the methodology used, whether the cross-selling reactions are modeled and whether the structure of the optimal policies are characterized. Kamakura et al. (1991 Kamakura et al. ( , 2003 predict consumption of products by customers who do not use them yet, and use it to identify crossselling opportunities in a customer database. Paas and Kuijlen (2001) identify customers with high likelihood of purchase of the next product given an acquisition pattern. These papers use database marketing techniques, and infer cross-selling opportunities from one-time measurements of current customer state while customer state may change dynamically in response to firms' actions. Li, Sun and Wilcox (2005) model the development of customer demand for multiple products over time and derive a product acquisition sequence based on customers' individual level of demand maturity. They acknowledge the effect of previous purchases on the purchase patterns using panel data over one year, however there is no estimation of future reactions to marketing interventions.
There is some research on cross-selling in call centers, typically formulated as queueing optimization problems (Aksin and Harker 1999 , Ormeci and Aksin 2009 , Byers and So 2007 ). While we do not consider queueing dynamics herein, we assume that each cross-sell attempt has an exogenously specified cost.
As Rust and Chung (2006) also note, most of the existing papers in the literature on CLV measurement and optimization suffer from the endogeneity problem, i.e. the fact that marketing interventions affect future profitability, however this is not taken into account in measurement and modeling. One exception is the paper by Sun, Li, and Zhou (2006) , where the authors formulate CRM interventions as stochastic dynamic programming problems, impacts of interventions on customer characteristics while optimizing CRM intervention decisions. That paper is more general and decision support oriented than ours, in that it employs a general adaptive learning model with Bayesian updating on beliefs about customer states, and numerically solves a dynamic optimization problem. The more stylized nature of our models allows us to provide analytical results on the structural properties of the optimal policies. Specifically, the main contribution of our paper is to propose an analytical model that endogenously considers customer reactions to cross-selling offers when setting cross-sell policies, provide an understanding of the change in policy structures due to these reactions and to help understand the value of keeping this information.
TOWARDS A MODELING FRAMEWORK
We start this section with a discussion of customer relationship features that we wish to model, and specific choices that we make pertaining to these features. We then formalize these features in a Markov Decision model.
Features of a Customer Relationship
We model a single customer's relationship with the firm, with the objective of finding cross-selling policies that maximize the total expected discounted lifetime value for that customer. Since the customer population is heterogeneous, such a model should be implemented for each customer separately to find individualized cross-selling policies. We focus on a setting where cross-selling attempts are made during customer initiated contacts with the firm. This focus, which does not consider outbound cross-selling attempts by the firm, enables us to restrict cross-selling related decisions to customer arrival epochs as opposed to considering any point in time a possibility for a cross-sell attempt. An example for such a setting would be an inbound call center with no outbound sales calls. It is assumed that each contact with the firm generates some revenue and a successful cross-sell attempt will result in additional revenue for that contact. Customer contacts are modeled as a random demand arrival process. The relationship is assumed to continue as long as the customer initiates contacts with the firm. The customer may decide to end the relationship at a random time.
We define a customer's maturity as his/her proximity to the point in time at which a particular product will be desirable. We assume that each contact increases the customer's so called maturity, or equivalently readiness for a particular product, implying that we take the number of contacts as a proxy for maturity. As the customer contacts the firm, their relationship is considered to evolve towards the next point of purchase, which is an uncertain point in time. This progression is the increase in customer maturity. In particular, we assume that the sequence of the products to be offered to a customer has already been fixed, i.e. there is a natural order (Paas and Kuijlen 2001 , Li et al. 2005 , Kamakura et al. 1991 to products that will be offered to a customer. Thus, all cross-sell attempts between two purchase epochs are made for the same product. In line with for example Li, Sun and Wilcox (2005) we can expect the probability of purchase on a cross-sell attempt to increase as maturity is increasing.
Once a cross-selling attempt results in success, i.e. once a good or service has been bought by the customer, the relationship moves on to the next product to be cross-sold. At such a point, we can envisage maturity to start afresh and proceed in an increasing manner at each contact towards the next point of purchase. In the models that we present later, whenever such a setting is appropriate, we use a state variable representing customer maturity to track the customer's progression between two purchase points.
At each contact with the customer, the firm decides whether to attempt a cross-sell or not. The decision trades off the additional revenue to be obtained with a certain probability, representing the event that the attempt is successful, with the immediate attempt cost and potential future value loss resulting from customer reactions in the case of failure.
Consecutive failed sales attempts are assumed to have a cumulative negative effect and are not forgotten. However once a product has been purchased by a customer, earlier failures and dissatisfaction resulting from them, are assumed to be forgotten. In other words, each purchase represents a renewal point for accumulated failure related dissatisfaction. This assumes that the most recent contact which has resulted in a positive outcome for the customer (a purchase) dominates and allows the customer to erase earlier negative feelings.
Loosely interpreted, this assumption could be motivated by a service recovery subsequent to repeated failures argument. Clearly, allowing for irritation effects to persist beyond the purchase point would enable capturing a richer setting, though modeling this additional feature would require tracking more state variables and would significantly affect the tractability of the resulting models. In summary, to model reactions to failed sales attempts, we will employ a state variable that keeps track of the number of failures since the last purchase.
That repeated service failures or negative critical incidents decrease customer satisfaction, which may change customer purchasing behavior, has been argued before (Smith and Bolton, 1998; Bitner, Booms, Tetrault 1990; Bowman and Narayandas 2001) . Following these arguments, we propose to model customer reactions to failed cross-sell attempts through model parameters that change as a function of the state variable measuring the number of failures since the last purchase. In this paper, we focus on reactions that manifest themselves in an increased probability of turning down the next sales offer. This is also consistent with the utility model presented by Li, Sun and Wilcox (2005) . That model estimates the utility of a customer for a financial product as a function of financial maturity of the customer (similar to maturity in our setting), switching costs, whether the customer owns that product from the competitors or not, and overall satisfaction of the customer with the bank. If failed cross-sell attempts are indeed like service failures or negative critical incidents, previous failures would decrease customer utility by decreasing overall satisfaction. Therefore, if the number of previous failures increases, ceteris paribus, the probability of accepting the offer is expected to decrease. Since prior empirical evidence of such a negative effect of failed attempts specific to cross-selling is not available, we use the following assumption in the analysis of the specific models: The probability of success of a cross-sell attempt for an individual decreases with an increase in the number of previous failed attempts.
A quasi-experiment provides support for this assumption. We have performed a survey-based in-class experiment with undergraduate students as participants. The context was chosen as a retail banking call center, since it is an industry where cross-selling is pursued regularly. The session lasted about one hour for each group of respondents. In each session three cross-sell offer scenarios were presented, interspersed among other unrelated surveys to create a longitudinal experience effect, and the likelihood of purchase was compared for each respondent using a repeated measures analysis.
The results support the decreasing effect of the number of previous failures on the likelihood of purchase. However the study has its limitations because of the difficulty of replicating cross-sell experience in a lab environment. Interested readers can refer to the Appendix for the details of this study.
Two other forms of customer reaction to failed cross-sell attempts can be envisaged: a reaction in the form of a lower contact rate, or an increased rate of quitting the firm. A customer reaction in the form of a lower contact rate implies a customer that reduces their utilization of existing services, thereby leading to a loss in revenues obtained from servicebased contacts for the firm, as well as fewer opportunities to cross-sell new products. A reaction in the form of an increased rate of quitting implies a customer with a shorter lifetime relative to the case without reactions, again affecting both service-based revenues and opportunities for further sales. The modeling framework we propose allows considering both of these forms of customer reactions, however this analysis is not pursued herein.
A Markov Decision Model
The state space is defined for the most general case, where both customer maturity and reactions to sales attempts may be present. The system has a two-dimensional infinite state space defined as {( ) 0 } S i j i j = , : ≤ ≤ , where i is the number of failed cross sell attempts since the last successful cross-sell, and j is the number of contacts since the last successful cross-sell which we take as a proxy for customer maturity. Note that j will increase with each contact, whereas i may increase if there is a cross-sell attempt that is unsuccessful, but will remain the same if there is no cross-sell attempt. Thus, i will always be less than or equal to j . As explained before, we assume that success allows the firm to start fresh, while failures between successes have a cumulative effect on the system. Formally, state (0 0) , is a renewal point for the system, visited when there is a successful cross-sell.
We assume that an individual customer initiates contacts with the firm according to a
Poisson process of rate λ . Depending on the nature of the firm and its products λ can be once a month, 5 times a year, etc. When the customer ends the relationship, we call this a "death", and the system state is denoted by "D" with zero expected profit. The customer lifetime with the firm is exponential with mean1 µ / . These assumptions are supported by Schmittlein et al. (1987) . In practice, estimating the contact rate is relatively straightforward, whereas even
observing that a customer has ended the relationship may be difficult in a non-contractual setting. We assume that a procedure to estimate the duration of the customer's lifetime as in Reinartz and Kumar (2003) is available.
Each contact produces expected revenue of R . Moreover, at each contact point, the firm may attempt to cross-sell to the customer, which will bring an additional revenue of r if the attempt is successful. An attempt fails with probability f P , while a cross-sell occurs with probability1 f P − . Every attempt has a cost a c , which reflects the operational burden of an attempt. Each failure reduces the overall revenue by incurring a cost of f c , where this cost can be interpreted as a one time loss of goodwill, or simply a decrease in R , the expected revenue of each contact. While λ , µ and f P can be functions of the state of a customer ( ) i j , , for the base model we denote them independent of ( ) i j , .
The firm aims to maximize expected discounted profits over an infinite time horizon.
The discount factor is denoted byα . The exponentiality of the customer contacts and lifetime allows us to use uniformization (Lippman 1975) with normalization. Hence, we can assume that the system observes an event only when an exponential clock with mean 1 runs out.
Then, this event is either a customer contact with probability λ or the death of the customer with probability µ , where
be the total expected maximal α -discounted profit of the system starting in state ( ) i j , over an infinite horizon. In other words, we observe the interaction of the customer with the firm until the customer ends the relationship, while collecting the corresponding revenues and incurring the appropriate costs at each contact by discounting them with a factor ofα . Then ( ) v i j , is the expected value of the total profit resulting from this process. Note that ( ) v i j , is generally referred to as the value function.
At each customer contact point, the firm decides whether to cross-sell or not considering the perceived probability of failure f P . As a result, the firm faces two choices in all states ( ) i j , : attempting a cross-sell or not attempting. If the firm decides not to cross-sell, then the system will earn a revenue of R, and the next event will be either a customer contact,
where the customer will be in state (i, j+1), or the end of the relationship. Hence, the corresponding expected return will be:
where λ denotes the probability that the customer contacts the firm again, µ is the probability that the customer ends the relationship and the expected future return is discounted by a factor of α. Note that since we do not earn from customers who leave the system, we set
. If the firm decides to cross-sell, the expected return will be given by:
In this case, the firm will still earn the reward R, but incur an attempt cost of c a . When the cross-sell attempt fails, which happens with probability P f , the customer will be in state (i+1, j+1) in his/her next contact with the firm. A successful cross-sell occurs with probability 1-P f , in which case the system earns extra revenue of r and the customer moves to state (0,0). This means the relationship moves to the next level and further cross-sell attempts will be for a new good or service. Finally, the customer may quit the relationship with the firm with probability µ . Now we can present the optimality equations whose solution will determine the value function ( ) v i j , : 
Models of Customer Reaction
Our conjecture is that there exists a positive relation between the probability of failure, f P , and the number of previous failures, i . That motivates one of our models (Model 1 in the following section) where a previous failed attempt increases the probability of failure, and we use the notation ( )
The second state dimension, j , models the relationship of the customer with the firm since the last successful cross-sell and represents customer maturity which was shown to have a positive relation with the probability of purchase in earlier studies. We consider another model (Model 2 in the following section) that assumes a decreasing probability of failure with an increase in the number of contacts, where we use the notation ( )
Finally, a model in which the probability of failure is a function of both the number of previous failures and the number of contacts will be analyzed (Model 3 in the following section). This model represents the direct negative effect of a past failure as well as the moderating effect of past contacts in the function of f P , and we use the notation ( )
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
We propose and analyze four models starting with a model that has no state-dependent parameters, and proceeding to models that depend either on the number of failed attempts state ( ) i , or on the customer maturity state ( ) j , or both state variables. We present the models in an order of increasing complexity; we start from the ones where the structure of optimal policies can be characterized and proceed to the most general one, where an analytical characterization is not possible.
Model 0: No Customer Maturity Progression and Reaction
Model 0, which represents the base case, is important since it sets a simple benchmark for the systems to be considered later on. In this case, there is no customer reaction, i.e.
parameters are independent of the state. Specifically, we assume ( )
When the parameters do not change with the state, the total return of the system is also independent of the state of the system, ( ) i j , , so that we can let v be the total expected maximal α -discounted profit of the system over an infinite horizon. This reduces the optimality equation to the following:
As a result, we can characterize the optimal decision easily: We have several observations: (1) The optimal policy either always cross-sells or never cross-sells through the lifetime of a customer; (2) This result is valid independent of the customer lifetime ( µ ) and contacts ( λ ), as well as the expected revenue R ; (3) f P is the key parameter that specifies optimal policies; (4) Using the optimal policy, it is straightforward to find the total expected discounted revenue, which is:
Proposition 1 states that for Model 0, the optimal cross-selling policy is not state dependent. We will refer to f P * as the threshold probability of failure in Model 0 or the base model. The threshold value is a natural result of the trade-off between the incremental costs of a cross-sell and the incremental revenue earned from a cross-sell. When there is no reaction or maturity progression effect, these incremental costs are constant and independent of the customer state; consequently the threshold probability f P * is independent of the state as well.
Therefore for this simplest model, if the probability of failure is below the threshold f P * , then it is always optimal to make a cross-sell attempt to that customer.
Model 1: Customer Reaction Only
In this model, we consider only the negative reaction of customers to failed cross-sell attempts by the firm. We assume that the probability of failure depends only on the number of failed attempts, i , with ( 1) ( )
for all i . The corresponding optimality equations are:
The following proposition characterizes the optimal policy for this model. Its proof is given in the Web Appendix.
Proposition 2. Under the assumptions of Model 1, the optimal policy is characterized as
follows:
then it is optimal not to cross-sell in all states. (2) If it is optimal not to cross-sell in a state k , then it is optimal not to cross-sell in all states
This result shows that the optimal policy can be of two types: (i) It is optimal not to cross-sell in all states; (ii) There is a threshold state i * such that it is optimal to cross-sell in all states i i * < and not to cross-sell in all states i i * ≥ . Note that i * may be infinity, implying that it is always optimal to cross-sell.
In practice this result implies that the static policy of segmenting the customers and always attempting a cross-sell to some, and never attempting a cross sell to others may still be optimal for some customer segments. On the other hand, for customers whose base probability of failure is not very high, a threshold type of policy may be required which takes the customer relationship history into account. In that case, the optimal policy would be to attempt a cross-sell only when the previous number of failures is not very high. The cost of a cross-sell attempt would increase as the reaction effect becomes stronger (with the increase in i), and that makes a threshold policy optimal. A threshold policy implies that once the threshold number of failures is exceeded, there will not be any further cross-sell attempts for that customer.
Model 2: Progression of Customer Maturity Only
This model considers the effect of more contacts with the firm. As explained before, we assume that as the number of contacts, j , increases, the probability of failure decreases,
for all j . Then, the state of the system consists of only the number of contacts and the optimality equations are given by:
We characterize the optimal policy of this model by the following proposition, whose proof can be found in the Web Appendix. This result shows that the optimal policy has one of the following forms: (i) It is never optimal to cross-sell; (ii) If it is optimal to attempt a cross-sell once, it will be optimal to cross-sell every now and then; (iii) If it is optimal to cross-sell once, it will always be optimal to cross-sell.
Proposition 3. Under the assumptions of Model 2, let
Form (i) corresponds to a system, where the maturity effect is not strong enough to induce an inherently unwilling customer to buy. Case (1) of Proposition 3, in which even the minimum probability of failure is higher than the threshold, corresponds to such a system. In form (iii), we have a system in which the company may wait for maturity to build up, and once it has, it is always possible to try to cross-sell. This happens when the maximum probability of failure, i.e., initial probability of failure (0) f P is less than the threshold f P * , as in Case (3). In form (ii), we have a weaker characterization: If maturity becomes strong enough to try cross-selling at some point, it will be strong enough again after a while. This corresponds to systems such as Case (2) of Proposition 3, where the initial probability of failure has a moderate value. In numerical experiments, not reported herein for brevity,
≤ , the optimal policy cross-sells in all states, whereas when (0)
there exists a state j * such that it is optimal to cross-sell in all states k j * ≥ .
Model 3: Both Progression of Customer Maturity and Reaction
In practice, as the relationship continues, customer maturity increases, and in addition to that, as there are failed cross-sell attempts, customers may react. Settings where both effects are present can be modeled by a probability of failure that depends on both state variables i and j . The system starts with a given probability of failure, P f (0, 0) . Every contact between two purchase points will lead to an increase in the state j , which implies a steady decreasing effect on ( )
, will occur irrespective of the crosssell policy. On the other hand, the state variable i will at times be increasing and at others remain the same, depending on the cross-sell decisions and outcomes at each contact. This implies that there will at times be an opposing effect of reaction, to that of maturity,
Whenever the maturity effect is not strong enough to dominate throughout, ( ) f P i j , will exhibit a non-monotone structure. The optimality equations for this model are given by:
When the form of ( ) f P i j , and all the parameter values are specified, the solutions of these equations can always be computed numerically by using one of the standard methods, such as the value or the policy iteration algorithms (Puterman 1994) . As before, for cases when the initial probability of failure, P f (0,0), is sufficiently high or low, optimal policies will be of the type never cross-sell or always cross-sell respectively. For the values of P f (0, 0) in between these values, the optimal policy shows a dynamic behavior (see Figure 1) . In Model 3, unlike Model 1 and 2, the optimal policy structure cannot be characterized by a single threshold, when it is dynamic, mainly due to the non-monotonic form of ( )
Rather, for each i value there will be a threshold on j , and for each j value there will be a threshold on i , resulting in an on-off type dynamic policy that alternates between attempting a cross-sell on some contacts (on) and not attempting to cross-sell on others (off).
We illustrate this behavior of the optimal cross-selling policy through two numerical examples. For these examples, the cost of a cross-sell attempt is set as , where the mean time between any two transitions is 11 time units. Finally, we note that the computational methods for evaluating the value functions and the optimal policy need a finite state space, which can be obtained by bounding the number of contacts, j . For the example, the number of contacts is bounded by 100. We can verify that the probability of reaching the boundary states (i.e., the states with j = 100) is very low for these examples.
Example 1
This example considers the simplest possible form for ( ) f P i j , , which is a linear function of the reaction effect and the customer maturity effect. This form ignores any dependency between i and j and treats them as linear effects on the base probability of failure:
The max() and min() functions ensure that ) , ( j i P f is between 0 and 1. Figure 2 (a) illustrates the optimal policy for 0 a =0.5, 1 a =0.08 and 2 a =-0.02. In the figure, for each state, when the action is "do not cross-sell", the next state is reached with a horizontal move to the right, and when the action is "cross-sell", the next state is reached with an upwards diagonal move if it is a failure, while the system is renewed and goes to state (0,0) if it is a success.
Consider the case when the relationship starts at state (0,0). Clearly the actions chosen do not demonstrate a specific pattern and after the first failure occurs, we observe an on-off pattern for cross-sell attempts. From this figure, we also observe the thresholds for each i and j. For example, when i=4, the threshold on j is 7 so that it is optimal to cross-sell for j≥7, and it is optimal not to cross-sell for 4≤j≤6 (recall that by definition, j cannot take values that are less than i). In words, with four prior failed attempts, making another cross-selling attempt will not be optimal until the customer's maturity reaches or exceeds seven contacts. Similarly, if for e.g., j=17, the threshold on i is 6, implying that it is optimal to cross-sell for i≤6, and not to cross-sell otherwise. In other words, when the number of contacts has reached 17, the negative effect of failed attempts up to six failed attempts can be absorbed however a seventh failed attempt's costs will exceed its potential benefits.
Example 2
In this example, we use the well-known logit model to represent ( ) f P i j , , the probability that a certain cross-sell attempt fails, where the underlying utility function is assumed to be linear in both the reaction and the customer maturity effects. More explicitly, for a customer exposed to a cross-sell attempt, the relative utility of not buying the proposed product when compared to buying is denoted by ) , ( j i U and given as:
where ε is the random component of this utility and follows a logistic distribution. Then the probability of failure is derived as: In this section we describe cross-selling at the inbound call center of a European retail bank, based on a limited cross-sell-attempts-and-results-by-date data set, and follow-up with managers at the call center. The purpose is to illustrate a setting where cross-selling is pursued as an important sales tactic through a descriptive analysis of the data, and to demonstrate how the probability of failure can be estimated in this setting.
The Data
The data set included dates and outcomes (i.e. customers' responses to each offer) of cross-sell attempts at the bank's inbound call center for 149 randomly selected customers, over a two year period (2006) (2007) . All attempts were made on inbound calls or customer initiated contacts. Each response was one of three alternatives: "Customer does not want to buy: Reject", "Customer wants to buy in the future: Maybe Later", or "Sales closed: Accept".
Managers stated that a cross-sell attempt only occurred when a customer indicated willingness to hear an offer and when call center congestion was deemed sufficiently low. Thus the data reflects the case of attempts where the customer has indicated a willingness to listen upfront and waiting times on hold (if any) were relatively low.
The data set includes a total of 2020 cross-sell attempts. Out of the 2020 attempts, 978
were made on the same date with another offer; therefore there are 1042 distinct attempt days for 149 customers. The data only specified the date of the contact; hence it is not clear whether two attempts on a single day were made during the same call or during different calls on the same day, and whether the products being offered were related in any way. A summary of descriptive statistics is given in Table 2 .
Cross-Selling as a Prevalent Practice at the Call Center
44% of all attempts resulted in success, while 33% of the time, the customers stated that they could buy at another time. On average, the number of products sold per customer was 5.95 (SD=4.99). A customer faced on average 13.55 cross-sell attempts, and rejected 3.15 of them, while postponing the decision in 4.46 of the cases. We were not provided with information regarding the products that were offered in these cross-sell attempts; however were informed that the product portfolio consisted of 20-30 products. The numbers regarding attempts and sales indicate that this bank pursues cross-selling in its inbound call center channel widely, regularly, and with success.
Descriptive Analysis of Cross-Sell Attempt Patterns
An analysis of time between cross-sell attempts reveals that the mean time between attempts is 25.31 days, with a large standard deviation of 54.28 days. Each customer experiences a large dispersion between minimum days and maximum days between two attempts. While part of the variation in time between attempts can be attributed to random calling patterns by customers, skipped attempts due to unwillingness expressed by customers, and congestion related controls at the call center, these are not the only factors. We are informed that on average a customer calls the bank several times a month. Follow-up with managers at the bank indicates that whenever a customer rejects an offer, a new offer for the same product is not made until a fixed number of days later. We explore the combined effect of all factors with the data next.
The effect of customer response on the time until the next attempt is analyzed using the One-Way ANOVA feature of SPSS 16, with three samples of time data, derived from 149 customers' 1872 responses after which there was another attempt (last data point for each customer was thus discarded). The means are found to be different for the three responses (F(2,1869)=27.29, p<0.0001). The next cross-sell attempt was made 15.85 days after a successful cross-sell, while this time increased to 29.12 days after a "maybe later" response, and it further increased to a mean time of 38.22 days after a failed attempt. In addition, multiple comparisons showed that all pairwise differences are also significant.
Cross-selling at the call center does not appear to be individualized by customer or segment. For example 21 customers or 14% of the pool of 149 never bought a product and 293 attempts (14% of the total) were made to these customers without success. To explore this further, we performed a cluster analysis using the K-Means Cluster feature of SPSS 16.
Accordingly, customers can be clustered in 3 groups based on their success/attempt ratio, with a significant number of customers in each group (See Table 3 ). The number of cross-sell attempts for these clusters were not found to be significantly different.
On Estimating the Probability of Failure
Our collaboration with the bank did not include a model implementation phase, however in this section we illustrate how the data could be used to estimate the probability of failure as a function of previous contacts and failures, for eventual use within the dynamic optimization model. We point out limitations of our current dataset, which when removed would lead to a superior empirical analysis. The current estimation should be viewed as an approximate one.
As presented in Example 2, we consider a random utility model for the cross-selling related choice a customer faces. The observable factors that affect this choice are the number of failures and the number of contacts. We consider both the reject and maybe later responses by customers as failures and assume renewal (i.e. the i state variable is set to zero) as in the model, subsequent to a purchase decision. Recall that the current dataset does not include the number of contacts by customers. Only attempt dates and their outcomes are available. In terms of our earlier notation, this implies that we do not have data for the state variable j. To overcome this shortcoming, we take time in days as a proxy for the j variable. No renewal of this is assumed after purchase decisions. We take the first day of our dataset as time zero for each customer, even though this is not ensured in the data. Clearly, a richer dataset with additional information like the type of product being offered or customer demographics would enable capturing more observable factors that affect purchase.
In the random utility model, unobservable (to the researcher) factors are accounted for through a random component. Assuming an extreme value distribution for this random component would give us the well known logit model. However the clustering portion of our descriptive analysis suggests the presence of heterogeneity. In our setting, we expect factors like the customer attitude towards impulse purchase to vary randomly, and as these are not accounted for by the observable portion of the model, the logit model will be a misspecification. To account for this, rather than estimating a standard logit model, we consider a random coefficients logit formulation, where the coefficients of the observable variables are assumed to be normally distributed. Our implementation follows Chapter 6.7 of Train (2003) . Results of this analysis are presented in Table 4 . We observe that the means of the coefficients for the number of failures and the number of contacts (days) have signs that are consistent with our assumptions in the modeling part of the paper. Thus, the number of failures has a positive coefficient, and the number of days has a negative coefficient. The standard deviation of each random coefficient (including the constant) is significant, indicating that there is heterogeneity with respect to these in the sample. The Share < 0 column indicates that all of the customers in the dataset have a positive coefficient for i, while 53% have an estimated coefficient that is negative for j, as assumed in the models. For the constant, 57% have a positive estimated value, implying that higher values for the base probability of failure are prevalent in the sample. These results provide support to our modeling premise, that failed cross-sell attempts may have a negative effect on customer's purchase probabilities. They further highlight the importance of considering customer heterogeneity in such an analysis.
An important issue that our current illustrative analysis ignores is endogeneity. In particular, it is possible that the observable variables which reflect the firm's cross-sell policy are correlated with the unobservable shocks captured by the random component. For example, we know that congestion in the call center affects cross-sell decisions and it is not unlikely that long waits created by this congestion will affect the customer's purchase probability. The firm's managers may take some of the unobservable factors into account in setting their crosssell policies, thus inducing a correlation between the observable variables and the random shock. Ignoring this correlation may result in a bias (Villas-Boas and Winer 1999), however
we defer such an analysis to future research.
Recommendations
The analysis of the cross-sell data indicates that both previous failed attempts and contacts may be playing a role in determining customer purchase probabilities. The importance of customizing cross-sell policies is underlined by the demonstrated heterogeneity. Based on the proposed modeling framework, we can qualitatively state that the bank could further enhance their cross-selling performance by customizing cross-sell policies to identify segments where cross-selling can be pursued more aggressively (always cross-sell), those where resources are not wasted on cross-selling (never cross-sell), and where cross-sell attempts are threshold based with the possibility of state dependent thresholds (on-off structure). Such a segmentation would require additional demographic or customer purchase history data to further explain some of the heterogeneity. An implementation of the model would also require data on revenues and costs. With such data, it would be possible to numerically compute the threshold value as well as the precise form of the on-off policy.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
This paper draws attention to possible negative reactions by customers to failed crosssell attempts. It presents a modeling framework that allows the endogenization of reactions to cross-selling in a forward-looking optimization model. Employing stochastic dynamic programming methodology enables characterizing the structural properties of optimal policies under different assumptions about customer purchase behavior in response to sales attempts.
The analysis indicates that whenever the probability of failure is not dependent on customer history (as modeled by Model 0), cross-sell policies will take one of two forms: always crosssell or never cross-sell. Once monotonic dynamic effects, as those modeled by Model 1 or 2 are introduced, optimal cross-sell policies take on a threshold type structure. The value of the threshold depends on the base probability of failure, and for very high or low values these threshold policies may reduce to always cross-sell or never cross-sell. Finally, if the probability of failure as a function of customer history is non-monotonically dynamic as in Model 3, for certain values of the base probability of failure, optimal policies will be of the on-off type (representing state dependent thresholds).
In Model 1 and Model 2 we were able to characterize some structural properties of the optimal cross-selling policies. These results were obtained under very general conditions, assuming no specific forms for the probability of failure functions, only requiring monotonicity of these. If future empirical research reveals additional characteristics of these functions, the structural properties of the optimal policies may also be strengthened further.
Both the threshold based and on-off structures highlight the role the cost of excessive cross-selling (direct as well as in the form of customer reactions) plays in optimal policies.
Managers need to be aware of this cost, and take it into account in their cross-selling decisions. Cross-selling to all customers, at every possibility will result in important value loss for firms.
APPENDIX

Quasi-Experiment
1: Design and Procedure
The context was chosen as a retail banking call center, which is a context with which all of the respondents are familiar. An interview with the branch manager on campus indicated that a credit card offer during a contact with their bank is a realistic cross-selling scenario for the students. Pilot tests with other students from the same business school confirmed that the respondents could identify themselves with the situation. In addition, follow-up questions verified that respondents were familiar with call centers and cross-selling: 91% percent of the respondents called a call center before, and 70% of them faced a cross-sell offer before. The respondents were presented with a scenario, which they were asked to assume while answering the questions that followed (See Part 3). The scenario presented in the experiment described an initial situation with a given financial maturity, satisfaction level, switching costs, and products owned at competitors, as can be seen in part I of the survey. No information was given about additional credit cards that they may be using in order to allow the respondents to consider their real situation while responding to thecross-sell offer.
The session lasted about one hour for each group of respondents. After the first question (M= 3.39 SD=1.55 N=94), respondents answered a 19 page survey for an unrelated study.
Subsequently, a second scenario was presented with a repeated credit-card offer. Respondents were asked to respond only if they had not accepted the previous offer (M=2.56 SD=1.39 N=66). The study continued with a 10 page unrelated survey. Finally, the third part of the study was presented, repeating the cross-sell attempt if they had not declared that they accepted the offer in the earlier attempts (M=1.84 SD=1.03 N=62). Such a design enabled us to let each respondent create their own history of contacts (with rejected or accepted offers) and to respond given that history, thus minimizing potential demand effects which would be present if we had just told them the outcome of prior attempts. Finally, right after the third cross-sell scenario, a follow-up questionnaire was presented (see Part 3). 33% of all respondents (47% of those who rejected all three offers) stated their primary reason for rejecting the offer as the fact that they did not like receiving repeated credit card offers. Mean response for the feeling scale among these respondents was 2.71, which confirmed their statement of dislike (M= 3.08 among respondents who rejected the offers for other reasons, M=3.85 among respondent who accepted an offer, and M=3.22 among all respondents). This suggests the possibility of a "reaction" effect underlying the results that will be presented next.
2: Results
Hypothesis 1 considers whether failed cross-sell attempts affect the probability of accepting a cross-sell offer for an individual. Since the relative probability of success for each individual was the main interest, a repeated measures within-subject analysis was chosen (Girden 1992) .
We performed an analysis of variance of the responses of respondents to credit-card offers using the Generalized Linear Model with Repeated Measures feature of SPSS 16, with the number of previous failures (i=0,1,2) as a within-subject factor. The sphericity assumption was met, and the main effect of number of previous failures was significant, (F(2,122)=20.33, p<0.001, ηp 2 =0.25) for all respondents. When we narrowed down the analysis focusing on only those respondents who stated their irritation as the primary reason for rejecting the third offer, the effect became stronger (F(2,60)=18.50, p<0.001, ηp2 =0. 
